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Self-esteem
In recent years there has been an explosion of interest in self-esteem. This has come about partly because of the prominence that ideas of therapy now have, but in some ways concern for self-esteem has a special importance in schools and other educational institutions. It is widely held to be something that it is not only important in itself but also crucial to educational achievement: children do badly at school, it is sometimes said, because they lack self-esteem. It is obviously the case not only that the term carries considerable emotive force but that it has become increasingly influential in thinking about education. To be clearer about these matters, we need to ask the simple question: what exactly is self-esteem?
The make-up of the term seems to connect it with the idea of estimation. So self-esteem seems to involve making some kind of estimation of oneself. But already there is a problem in that the word ‘esteem' always carries positive connotations, whereas ‘estimate' does not. What should we say of someone who has a very negative estimation of themselves – let's say, a negative self-image? If we say that they have low self-esteem, this will not be low in the way that one may be low in one's estimate of, say, the time needed for a journey. It will rather be that they lacked self-esteem: they are deficient in the quality in question. Now quite commonly in the literature it seems to be implied that self-esteem can be deficient, so this seems to fit with our analysis so far, but – unlike the estimate of journey-time, which could be high - it is rarely suggested that one might have too much! Indeed, what would someone with too much self-esteem be like? Is this simply what happens where a person overestimates her abilities – in other words, has an inflated idea of herself? This line of thought points towards what seems to be a promising principle: to have a healthy amount of self-esteem one must make a just assessment of one's abilities and qualities. Given that much of what we are concerned with in education is leading people to see things truly, the idea of a just assessment is a powerful and attractive one. Have we found then the answer we need?
If we accept this principle, this will entail that someone like, say, Nelson Mandela should recognise his own remarkable qualities; the tyrants of this world, like Saddam Hussein, should come to understand what rogues they are. To see things truly in this way must surely be to the good. But if we transfer this to the classroom and consider the kinds of qualities we are typically concerned with there, things do not seem so straightforward. For there will be children in our class who succeed in most of the tasks they are given – not just in their more academic work but in sport and creative activities too – and who, what is more, are attractive characters, popular with classmates and staff alike. But these ‘Mandelas' of the classroom will contrast not so much with anyone like Saddam but with those who are just not much good at any of the things listed here and who are scarcely the most popular members of the class either. If just assessment of abilities and qualities is the aim, then, these people should have low estimations of themselves. And with this we seem to have arrived at the very reverse of what motivates emphasis on self-esteem. This also seems wrong in terms of our ordinary usage for we do not say of someone who has a low opinion of themselves, because of their limited abilities and qualities, that they have the right amount of self-esteem. Now there is a familiar move that the educator may be tempted to make at this point. The reason, it will be said, that we have run into problems here is that we have failed to realise the ways in which people have different strengths: someone may not be good at academic work, but perhaps they are good at sport instead; someone may not be good at sport, but no doubt their creativity in art needs to be allowed to develop. Something along the lines of this wishful thinking was behind the so-called compensatory theory of intelligence, now widely discredited. The truth is altogether much harsher: some people are able, gifted, attractive; others simply are not.
So where does this leave our account of self-esteem as involving the just assessment of one's abilities and qualities. It is surely on the rocks. Now we had some intimation of this early on when we recognised the positive connotations that ‘esteem' carries in contrast to the more neutral ‘estimate'. Yet we cannot divorce self-esteem from some kind of assessment of one's worth. The teacher's instinct that leads her to want all of her pupils to have healthy self-esteem can be defended but not, as we have seen, if this depends upon the assessment of qualities and abilities. But what else is there when it comes to considering someone's (one's own) worth? The answer is to be found by recognising that people are more than the sum of their abilities and qualities, all of which are to be judged in terms relative to the achievement of others: they are of absolute worth simply as human beings. Such a notion is encountered in the way that we are, for example, equal before the law; it is implicit in the way that, in principle, at least, we do not distribute medical benefits to people according to their distinctive aptitudes or achievements or renown; and it is there in the way that we are reluctant to say that one human life is worth more than another. In some respects this way of thinking has religious origins – for example, in the idea that we are all equal before God. But an important reference for it in philosophical terms is undoubtedly Immanuel Kant's principle that we should always treat human beings as ends-in-themselves, never solely as means.
This analysis would undoubtedly have its critics. But it has value in (a) uncovering the uncertainty and confusion that typically surround what is now a prominent and emotive term, in (b) reducing the chances of teachers' succumbing to sentimental conceptions of children, equality and ability, and in (c) indicating the ways that educational practice can become overly concerned with ability and achievement. If the analysis is wrong, a cogent rebuttal would still involve addressing the kinds of problems it raises and hence relate to the practical matters that motivate this conceptual enquiry.
For further reading: to take these matters further and in different directions, revealing further what is at issue here, see Ruth Cigman's ‘Self-Esteem and the Confidence to Fail' ( Journal of Philosophy of Education , 35.4, 561-576) and ‘Situated Self-Esteem' ( Journal of Philosophy of Education , 38.1, 91-105), Richard Smith 's ‘Self-Esteem: The Kindly Apocalypse' ( Journal of Philosophy of Education , 36.1, 87-100) and Kristján Kristjánsson 's ‘Justified Self-Esteem' ( Journal of Philosophy of Education , 41.2).
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