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Political liberalism
Liberalism can be construed as a political tradition in which the freedoms and rights of individuals play a central role. Historically, this tradition developed in opposition to feudalism and monarchy, seeking to replace the arbitrary authority of rulers with predictable, rational processes of government and legislation, and the constitutional protection of civil rights. But while the word “liberal” is often used fairly loosely to refer to various positions concerned with the protection of individual freedoms, freedom of the market, and toleration, “political liberalism” refers to a theoretical conception developed by political theorists - most notably by the contemporary political philosopher, John Rawls. Crucially, such theorists argue that while liberalism in its many variants can, and often does, include substantive ethical, epistemological and metaphysical commitments regarding individuals and society, political liberalism is a purely political theory potentially acceptable to all reasonable members of society, whatever their moral values or beliefs.
One way to understand Rawls' theory is to see it as an attempt to overcome the apparent tension between individual freedom and equality. In trying to answer the question of what rules or principles would enable people to live together in a society that is both just and stable, even though they may be very different in terms of their socio-economic positions, fundamental values and beliefs, Rawls suggested that we imagine free, equal and rational people working out what principles they could agree to. The results of this thought experiment, known as “the original position”, lead Rawls to formulate his two “principles of justice”, which both guarantee fair equality of opportunity in access to socio-economic positions, and restrict the extent of socio-economic inequalities. The intuition underlying political liberalism are that people's access to jobs and other social positions should not depend on the circumstances of their birth or their natural assets. Furthermore, political liberalism assumes an inevitable degree of pluralism in terms of people's different, and even competing, comprehensive versions of the good (e.g., religious doctrines, moral commitments). The role of the liberal state, on this view, is to enable people to coexist in a fair and stable way in spite of these differences. One important implication of this view is that the state should not, in any of its procedures or institutional arrangements, reflect any bias towards one or another comprehensive doctrine but should remain neutral regarding this pluralism of conceptions of the good.
It is, thus, clear why political liberalism raises important questions for education: Should education, as part of the public sphere of the state, be politically neutral? If so, what does this mean in terms of curricula and educational policy? Recent debates such as that over the wearing of the Muslim headscarf in schools, or state funding of faith schools, illustrate the ways in which principles such as the liberal commitment to state neutrality are interpreted differently in different social and political contexts. Philosophers of education in recent years have developed rich accounts of the educational implications of various aspects of political liberalism. Harry Brighouse , for example, has looked at the implications of Rawls' position for questions such as school choice and private schooling. Others have focused on the extent to which the principle of neutrality should and can be reflected in school curricula and policy. While some philosophers of education, such as William Galston, argue that public education in the liberal state should restrict itself to the minimal civic virtues concerned with supporting the political community, allowing for maximum feasible accommodation of different values and points of view, others, such as Eamonn Callan and Amy Gutmann, argue that political liberalism requires that public schools actively seek to develop in students the capacities for autonomous deliberation and critical reflection on qualitatively different ways of life.
Other theorists, particularly feminist theorists, have questioned the very notion of neutrality as a central ideal of political liberalism and have offered critiques of the philosophical assumptions behind it regarding the nature of the self, the meaning of justice and the idea of difference.
For further reading, see:
Galson, W. “Value Pluralism and Political Liberalism”
http://www.puaf.umd.edu/IPPP/galston.htm
Jonathan, R. (1995) “Liberal Philosophy of Education: A Paradigm Under Strain?” Journal of Philosophy of Education, 29. 1.
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1995.tb00343.x?prevSearch=allfield%3A%28political+liberalism%29
Mulhall, S. (1998) “Political Liberalism and Civic Education: The Liberal State and is Future Citizens”, Journal of Philosophy of Education , 32. 2.
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1467-9752.00085
Rawls, John (1993). Political Liberalism. New York : Columbia University Press
White, J., et al. (2003) Five critical stances towards liberalism, Journal of Philosophy of Education , 37.
Young, I. M (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference , Princeton University Press.
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